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Cooperative Mergers 
and Acquisitions: 
The Role of Capital Constraints 
Timothy J. Richards and Mark R. Manfredo 
Several explanations for merger activity exist for publicly traded firms, but none 
consider the unique aspects of  cooperatives. This study develops a test for the 
hypothesis that cooperative consolidation occurs primarily in response to capital 
constraints associated with a lack of access to external equity capital. An empirical 
model estimates the shadow value of long-term investment capital within a multi- 
nomial logit model of transaction choice in a panel data set of  the 100 largest U.S. 
cooperatives. The results substantially confirm the capital-constraint hypothesis. 
Thus, the primary implication is that  internal growth may be a more viable alterna- 
tive to consolidation if new forms of cooperative financing are developed. 
Key words: capital structure, cooperative, discrete choice, joint ventures, mergers, 
multinomial logit, strategic alliances 
Introduction 
A large number of studies address both the motivations for mergers, acquisitions, and 
other activities as well as their impact on firm value (Jensen and Ruback).' While a 
unifylng theory of the ultimate causes of mergers and acquisitions does not exist, most 
studies suggest that publicly traded firms engage in these activities to increase the 
value of the combined firm relative to the individual firms through economies of scale 
or through operational or financial synergies (Jensen and Ruback; Lewellen; Post; 
Scherer). Managerial hubris has also been suggested as a motivating factor, even if the 
intent of managers of acquiring firms is not malicious (Roll). Still other studies explain 
merger and acquisition activity as a consequence of more macroeconomic influences- 
following "merger waves" or as a response to industry shocks (Golbe and White; Linn 
and Zhu; Mitchell and Mulherin; Gort; Post). Today, long after the  conglomerate merger 
wave of the 1960s (Hubbard and Palia), mergers and acquisitions continue at  a rapid 
pace, particularly among agribusinesses. 
While the bulk of  this activity occurs among publicly traded firms, closely held 
companies, mutual insurance firms, and cooperatives are not immune. In  fact, because 
these firms must often compete with publicly traded firms within their own industries, 
efficiency-driven consolidation  typically spreads across organizational forms as  a natural 
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consequence of the process of creative destruction. However, non-publicly traded firms 
in  industries without such competitive pressures have also experienced large numbers 
of mergers and acquisitions (see figure I), so their cause remains an open question. 
In particular, cooperatives present a unique problem because cooperatives are not 
formed to generate  and retain profits, but rather  to  provide members with market access 
or other economic  benefits that  make  their primary businesses more profitable. Because 
they lack an  overt profit motive and cannot logically cede control to outside equity 
investors, most cooperatives do not issue publicly traded stock.'  Equity financing of 
cooperative organizations is  facilitated through member contributions to  the  cooperative 
(Cobia)  or through retained "patronage refunds." Without a clear mandate to maximize 
the value of the cooperative, therefore, it is not clear whether the factors observed to 
drive mergers and acquisitions among publicly traded firms are  necessarily those that 
cause similar behavior among cooperatives. 
Cooperatives' lack of access to equity markets and their mandate to return all profits 
to their owner-members, however, can create one unique motivating factor-namely, 
cooperatives tend to operate under conditions of  severe capital constraint, typically 
relying on bank financing or bond issuance for the bulk of their capital needs. These 
conditions are  similar to those experienced by publicly traded firms decades ago. In  fact, 
Veblen (1924) first recognized that the merger wave of the 1890s was in large part 
facilitated by the development of new financial instruments which allowed acquiring 
firms to build a capital base greater than the value of their own assets. By valuing a 
firm's earning  potential, its  goodwill, or other intangible factors, firms  were able to issue 
preference shares or debt instruments in excess of the value of existing assets, thus 
lifting a credit constraint that  prevented expansion (Hake). Hubbard and Palia provide 
empirical evidence showing this theory explains the performance of  merging firms 
during the 1960s conglomerate merger wave. This earlier lack of financial instruments 
did not reappear during  the  merger and acquisition wave in the 1980s  because external 
capital markets had developed sufficiently to overcome these internal capital deficien- 
cies. Similarly, Fluck and Lynch theorize that conglomerate mergers are a mechanism 
for firms to fund projects with positive net present values which could not be financed 
internally, thereby allowing the firm to circumvent a capital constraint. 
This study seeks to test the hypothesis that capital constraints are a prime moti- 
vating factor behind cooperatives seeking to merge with, acquire, form a joint venture 
with, or create  a strategic alliance with another. Therefore, after adequately controlling 
for all other factors that  can explain cooperative merger and acquisition activity, there 
should  be a positive correlation  between the  severity of a cooperative's capital constraint 
and the probability it will merge with another cooperative or another publicly traded 
firm-one  that  is less capital constrained. Consequently, the objectives of this analysis 
are  first, to identify the  factors that  explain ownership transactions among  cooperatives, 
and second, to determine whether capital constraints are  indeed a factor driving 
mergers, acquisitions, strategic alliances, and joint ventures. The study begins with a 
description of a conceptual model of cooperative consolidation drawing from many 
branches of this disparate literature to form a set of testable hypotheses. 
Although cooperatives are assumed to maximize the sum of producer surplus and consumer (member)  surplus instead 
of profit, we show below that their behavior is  observationally equivalent to a for-profit frm  in a competitive industry. Conse- 
quently, measures of profitability are valid indicators of cooperative performance. 154  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Year 
Figure 1. Cooperative merger and acquisition activity, 
1980-1998 
Economic Model of 
Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions 
Despite the depth of both empirical and qualitative studies on merger and acquisition 
activity, a well-defined, general theory of  its underlying causes still does not exist.3 
However, existing studies  do provide solid guidance in defining the  fundamental factors 
likely to be important in explaining merger and acquisition activity. These factors can 
be broadly classified into two groups, depending largely upon whether the  focus is  at  the 
firm or industry level: (a)  structural or microeconomic, and (b)  time series or macro- 
economic. 
Structural or microeconomic analyses follow the theory of corporate finance in defin- 
ing a set of variables intended to explain the probability that a firm will merge with or 
acquire another firm.4 This "market for corporate control" approach explains mergers 
and acquisitions as  a means by which parties external to the firm may be able to unlock 
unrealized value through a takeover (Jarrell, Brickley and Netter; Jensen 1986,1988; 
Jensen and Ruback). 
The second approach, which views merger and acquisition activity more as  a cyclical 
phenomenon, explains such transactions as being driven by "merger and acquisition 
waves" and macroeconomic factors (Weston and Jawien; Linn and Zhu; Resende; Golbe 
and White; Mitchell and Mulherin). Accordingly, studies  of this general class tend to use 
time-series methods where the objective lies more in characterizing the shape of  the 
cycle than in seeking the  underlying cause of each type of activity. Because mergers and 
For an extensive review of  the literature, see Post. 
This study considers the initiator of the transaction, or the acquiring 6rm,  rather than the target for two reasons. First, 
the motivations driving each are likely to be significantly  different. Second, the decision of  the target is likely to be con- 
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Table  1. Determinants of Merger and Acquisition Activity 
Hypothesized 
Reason for Consolidation  Variable NameIDescription  Sign " 
Cost Reductions  ASSET  TURNOVER  RATIO 
Revenue Enhancement  SALES  GROWTH  RATE  (%) 
Profitability  RETURN  ONASSETS  (%) 
Extent of Capital Constraint  CURRENTRATIO 
Macroeconomic Variables  GDP GRO~RAITE  (growth rate of real GDP, %) 
T-BILL  YIELD  (30-year T-bond yield, %) 
AGRIBUSINESS  M&A  (total mergers and acquisitions 
in  agribusiness industry, both cooperatives and non- 
cooperatives) 
VALUE  OFAG  OUTPUT  (growth rate of U.S. agricultural 
output) 
S&P500 INDEX  GROWTHRATE  (%) 
Value of Capital Constraint  kc (shadow value of capital constraint facing a 
cooperative-estimated) 
"The hypothesized sign indicates the expected effect of each explanatory variable on the probability of observing 
each particular type of consolidation activity. 
acquisitions are likely due to both internal or firm-specific factors and other factors that 
are more economy- or industry-wide, any comprehensive model of  merger and acquisi- 
tion activity should include elements of  both. 
This section outlines a series of  variables intended to capture each type of  effect on 
merger and acquisition activity,  beginning with microeconomic factors. Table 1  provides 
a summary of  the micro- and macroeconomic determinants and the expected signs of 
their marginal impact on the probability that a cooperative  chooses some type of consoli- 
dation activity. 
Perhaps the most common reason for a merger or acquisition is the search for 
synergy-the  desire to create a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Potential 
sources  of incremental  cash flow gains resulting from synergies include revenue enhance- 
ment through more market power (Comanor; Scott; Perry and Porter), cost reductions 
through economies of scale, lower internal transactions costs (Williamson),  or improved 
managerial performance in general (Hay and Liu). In this study, opportunities for 
synergy are measured as the total asset turnover ratio, a key indicator of asset manage- 
ment efficiency, in addition to more direct measures of  growth and profitability. 
Although cooperatives  with high turnover ratios may have little to gain from combin- 
ing with another, they may also be better able to utilize a larger asset base, so the net 
effect on the likelihood of a merger is expected to be positive. Growth is measured as the 
annual rate of increase in sales. Fast-growing  cooperatives  may be more likely to merge 
or make an acquisition simply because they regard buying into another market as a 
means of assuring future growth. The study measures profit using return on assets. 
Unprofitable cooperatives may need the human, financial, or marketing resources of 
another firm in order to survive. Therefore,  profitability likely exerts anegative influence 
on the probability of consolidating, but sales growth may have a positive effect. 156  April2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
A cooperative's ability to take advantage of opportunities for synergy, however, de- 
pends upon the state of its balance sheet. Adelaja, Nayga, and Farooq include various 
financial ratios to test their "liquidity hypothesis," and other ratios to test a "leverage 
hypothesis"-both  intended to measure the adequacy of a firm's capital base. However 
well these variables capture the extent of a capital constraint facing a firm, they do not 
measure its value. 
Consider two cooperatives  having equal current and debt-to-equity ratios, both clearly 
inferior to the average for the industry. Suppose further that one of these cooperatives 
has a very low growth rate and low returns to capital. It  is highly leveraged and barely 
solvent, but still manages to provide service to its existing members. Compare this firm 
to the second firm, whose poor liquidity and high leverage ratios are caused not by poor 
performance, but by rapid growth amidst inadequate capital. In this case, the shadow 
value of the capital constraint is likely to be very high and would represent a source of 
unrealized value for a potential merger partner. In the former case, the shadow value 
of its capital would likely be low, and it  would consequently be a poor merger candidate. 
Therefore, the shadow value of  a cooperative's capital, holding the extent of  leverage 
constant, is likely to exert a positive impact on the probability of consolidation. 
Proxies for the  adequacy of a cooperative's capital stock include measures of liquidity 
(current  ratio)  and  leverage (debt-to-asset  ratio). More liquid (higher current ratio) 
cooperatives have a greater ability to buy into another, so this effect is expected to be 
positive. On the  other hand, the  higher a cooperative's debt-to-asset ratio, the  less likely 
it  will be able to afford a merger or acquisition, and so this effect is more probably nega- 
tive. Below, we account for the cost of obtaining more debt capital by including the  yield 
on long-term government bonds among our macroeconomic factors. 
Macroeconomic trends are also likely to fuel expectations of  future growth oppor- 
tunities and profitability. Sectoral cycles in the number of  consolidation transactions 
suggest there are somewhat predictable patterns in activity-patterns  commonly 
referred to as  "merger and  acquisition waves" (Golbe and  White; Resende; Linn and 
Zhu). Holding firm-specific  factors constant, periods of clustered merger and acquisition 
activity imply a higher probability of initiation of some form of merger or acquisition by 
a business. 
These merger and  acquisition waves, however, may simply be reflections of the  cyclical 
behavior of macroeconomic variables which are the true underlying causes of merger 
and acquisition activity. Gort notes that merger and acquisition waves arise as a 
response to structural changes (shocks) in the macroeconomy such as  increased foreign 
competition, deregulation, changes in disposable income, and aggregate stock market 
performance. Such disturbances can also cause a greater dispersion of value estimates 
among potential investors, increasing the likelihood an acquirer will overvalue a firm 
relative to the current owners' reservation price. 
Of course, macroeconomic shocks affect different sectors of the economy in a variety 
of ways. For example, if an  industry is experiencing rapid, scale-intensive  technological 
change, the ability of smaller, formerly profitable firms to survive may be challenged, 
requiring them to merge horizontally or to acquire others in their industry in order to 
reduce costs and operate on a more efficient scale (Chan et  al.). Such responses may also 
be defensive, or strategic in nature. If a firm adopts a strategy of rapid investment and 
acquisition to increase its productive capacity for the purpose of preempting entry or 
investment by rivals, then this may cause other firms in the industry to consolidate in Richards and Manfred0  Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions  157 
order to reduce costs to compete at  the new, lower cost structure (Schenk; Jensen 1986). 
Thus, restructuring by one firm may cause similar changes among others. 
These macroeconomic factors are measured using four variables. First, the interest 
rate  on long-term government bonds (30-year U.S. Treasury bonds) provides a measure 
of the cost of capital. Because most cooperative mergers or acquisitions are likely to be 
financed by debt capital, we expect this effect to be negative. Second, the growth rate 
of gross domestic product (GDP) serves as a measure of overall economic activity. 
Third, the growth rate of  U.S. agricultural output is included because, as a first 
approximation, firms  are  more likely to perceive opportunities for expansion in  a growing 
market. Gort, however, provides three reasons why growth should be negatively related 
to the probability of a merger: (a)  the capacity to support a larger number of firms rises 
with growth, (b)  the need to prevent competition falls with growth, and  (c)  rapidly grow- 
ing demand allows firms to exploit economies of scale without merging. Consequently, 
the net effect of growth is indeterminate. 
Fourth, merger and acquisition waves among non-cooperatives, driven largely by 
cycles in stock market prices, may cause mergers and acquisitions among cooperatives. 
If their publicly traded rivals are using inflated stock values to merge horizontally and 
increase market share, cooperatives in the same industry may be forced to do likewise. 
The effect of merger waves is captured here by including the total number of mergers 
and  acquisitions in  the  agribusiness industry  each year, both cooperatives and  non-coop- 
eratives. This  variable is  expected to have apositive impact on the  likelihood of observing 
a merger or acquisition. The indirect effect of aggregate stock market performance on 
the choice of merger and acquisition activity is measured by including the annual rate 
of appreciation of the S&P 500 share index. 
Mergers and acquisitions are also likely driven by more firm-specific  valuation mea- 
sures. Commonly, friendly mergers and acquisitions among cooperatives are completed 
at  book value, despite the apparent superior value of one of the merger  partner^.^ One 
usual practice in empirical studies is to measure whether a publicly traded firm is 
undervalued by estimating Tobin's Q, or the market value of a firm's equity relative to 
its replacement cost. This study develops a proxy variable for Tobin's Q in cooperatives 
that  measures the  shadow value of the capital constraint facing a cooperative. A cooper- 
ative with a high implicit valuation of its internal capital would likely regard the value 
of capital obtained as a result of a merger as equal to its own shadow value which, if 
above the shadow value of the target firm, represents a strong incentive to merge. 
Hubbard and  Palia argue  that  development  of capital markets  was  largely responsible 
for the decline in post-conglomerate merger returns between the 1960s and 1980s. We 
suspect firms in the 1960s were in a situation very similar to the experience of coopera- 
tives today. Cooperatives are  notoriously  capital constrained, so mergers and acquisitions 
may arise because the target firm serves as a pool of underutilized capital, suggesting 
the shadow value of a cooperative's capital stock is likely to exert a significant, positive 
effect on the probability of initiating a merger or acquisition. The next section describes 
the procedures used in estimating this value and testing its impact on the decision to 
consolidate. 
The apparent irrationality in this practice is consistent with the cooperative principle of "cooperating  with each other," 
so taking advantage of any ownership-arbitrage opportunity is  beyond consideration. 158  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
The Econometric Model 
According to the  foregoing discussion, cooperative managers implicitly follow a two- 
stage decision process in evaluating a merger or acquisition opportunity. First, they 
determine the marginal value of additional capital  to their cooperative, and second, they 
determine how this  will affect their decision to consolidate with another  firm. The econo- 
metric model compresses tbis  process into a simultaneous realization of the  value of any 
capital constraint and the  probability of choosing each type of transaction. To accomplish 
this, the decision process is modeled using a multinomial logit approach. 
Prior to estimating the discrete choice model, however, it is first necessary to derive 
an  expression for the  value of the  capital constraint facing each cooperative. For a profit- 
maximizing firm, the  shadow value of capital  is defined simply as  the  marginal contribu- 
tion to profit from an  incremental unit of capital. However, cooperatives do not maximize 
profit per se, but rather the sum of surplus earned by their members both as  customers 
and owners of the cooperative. Taking a producer-cooperative as  an  example, a cooper- 
ative's objective function includes both its own profit and the profit its members derive 
from selling their output to the  cooperative. Define this objective in general terms as  the 
sum of member producer surplus (n,)  and cooperative profit (n,) from purchasing a 
quantity of farm output x,  at  a pricep, subject to a farm-output supply curve defined by 
p,(x)  and sold by the cooperative after processing or handling as output y at  a price, p,, 
incurring a fmed cost of F (Fulton): 
(1)  max W  = max[n,  px(x)  dx + P,Y  -  pxx, - 
X  X 
Whether in a competitive or imperfectly competitive industry structure, the  value of 
farm output drops out so that the solution to this problem of vertical integration clearly 
requires the price paid for member output to equal the  marginal value product from the 
cooperative level: p,  =  p,($~/ax).~ 
Without loss of generality, we can extendthis simple example to allow a more complex 
technology at the cooperative level and apply the same logic. Specifically, the optimal 
input decision from a cooperative's perspective is the one that maximizes cooperative 
profit alonewhether the input is purchased from the member or not. Therefore, an 
expression for the shadow value of capital is derived by treating capital as  a fmed factor 
in a dual restricted profit function frame~ork.~  Of the many candidates for a suitable 
functional form for the  restricted profit function, the Generalized Leontief (GL) (Diewert) 
has many desirable attributes and has been used in several empirical applications with 
acceptable results  (see  Lopez for an  example).  In  particular, the GL form offers the 
benefits of linear homogeneity without normalization, while both symmetry and 
convexity can be tested and imposed.' Further, because it is a flexible functional form, 
'This  is true because cooperative  owners have an  interest in both profits and favorable prices, so cooperatives  must maxi- 
mize the sum of producer and consumer surplus. This outcome is commonly known as  the "competitive  yardstick effectn  of 
cooperative behavior (Fulton; Schmiesing). A reviewer notes that Royer and Bhuyan obtain a different result under the 
assumption the cooperative  is "activen  in the sense that it can control the amount of member input, whereas we assume the 
more typical "passiven  case. 
Alternatively, a restricted dual revenue function could be used, but this would not represent a significant change from 
our current approach. 
'Convexity in  prices requires the Hessian to be positive semi-definite,  while concavity  in a single quasi-fixed  input requires 
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it approximates any arbitrary alternative. The profit function (1)  for a representative 
cooperative can be written in more detail (suppressing time subscripts for simplicity) as 
follows (Morrison): 
where C is the total number of cooperatives, p is a vector of N netput prices (p,  < 0  for 
inputs,  p,  > 0  for outputs), Kc is a fxed factor, and E,  is an i.i.d. random variable. This 
function is estimated over all cooperatives (c) and time periods as written above. 
If data on specific outputs and inputs are  available, the parameters of (2) can be more 
efficiently estimated by applying Hotelling's  and Shephard's  lemmas to (2) and esti- 
mating a system of output supply and input demand equations. However, our interest 
here lies in the shadow value of capital. Taking the derivative of (2) with respect to Kc, 
provides an  expression for the shadow value of capital for each cooperative in each time 
period: 
which is  a firm-specific measure of the value of the individual cooperative's capital con- 
straint. The variable Kc is defined as  the ratio of long-term debt to total debt so that a 
higher proportion of long-term debt relative to total debt in a cooperative's capital stock 
represents a higher value of Kc,  and thus less of a constraint. This definition is appropri- 
ate  because, first, cooperative equity-redemption policies mean that  measures of equity 
are  poor measures of a cooperative's capital stock and, second, long-term debt is  regarded 
as the key component of a cooperative's permanent capital. Defined this way, the value 
of A,  is expected to be nonnegative if the capital constraint is  binding. The effect of capi- 
tal  constraints on a cooperative's choice of consolidation  activity is  tested by substituting 
this expression for A,  in the multinomial logit model described next, thus collapsing the 
two-stage conceptual approach to a single econometric model. 
The alternative choices include participation in either a merger, an  acquisition, a 
strategic alliance, or a joint venture. Further, although some cooperatives are involved 
in more than  one merger or acquisition in any given year, there are  too few of these mul- 
tiple-activity observations to permit efficient estimation of a count-data model. Rather, 
a multinomial logit model is used to describe the choice among discrete alternatives. 
Assume an  expression for the latent  "desire to consolidate" shows the  utility from consol- 
idating as the sum of a deterministic (Vr;) and a random component (E:)  such that: 
where Xr;t  is a scalar of attributes of both choice r and chooser c, including the expres- 
sion for the shadow value of  capital given in equation (3) above. The probability of 
choosing alternative r in time period t depends upon the realization of E:: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics  160  April 2003 
(5)  Pro - 
or, assuming the error terms are i.i.d. extreme value, the probability of  choosing r be- 
comes: 
for each alternative. 
When estimating multinomial logit models, it is necessary to normalize the response 
coefficients of  one choice to zero (pi = 0) so the remaining parameters are defined as 
incremental to that case. Because there are many years for each cooperative wherein 
no activity occurs, we define this state as the "base case." Further, unobserved sectoral- 
heterogeneity is accounted for in the pooled time-series,  cross-section  data by estimating 
(6)  in a fxed-effects framework. With this assumption, each component of X,  has a com- 
mon effect across all cooperatives, but the intercept varies by a cooperative's industrial 
sector, e.g., dairy, input supply, cotton, grain, diversified, fruit and vegetable, sugar, or 
meat and poultry. Finally, most of  the financial-performance measures are likely to be 
endogenous. Therefore, the multinomial logit model is estimated using lagged values of 
each so they are predetermined and uncorrelated with the equation errors when no serial 
correlation is present. 
Data Sources and Methods 
To explain the financial motivations behind cooperative merger and acquisition  activity, 
this study requires two separate data sets: financial data for all agricultural cooper- 
atives and a qualitative chronicle of their transactions. These data come from a variety 
of sources. First, descriptions  of each transaction (names,  dates, type of transaction, and 
transaction value) are taken from publicly available records for the sample period 
1980-1998. The Food Institute provides profiles of  all mergers and acquisitions in the 
food and beverage industry in its Food Business Mergers and Acquisitions publication. 
This information is then combined with reports of  activity among cooperatives, derived 
from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) publication Rural Cooperatives, and 
from a wide variety of  trade media accessed via the Lexis-Nexis database. 
Having identified cooperatives involved in these transactions, USDA officials then 
merge the qualitative "activity" data with detailed financial data obtained from the 
USDALRural Business Cooperative Service's Top 100 Cooperatives databa~e.~  In total, 
data describing 88 cooperatives were generated, but because some are removed due to 
their combining with another cooperative, and some are created anew, the final data set 
consists of  an unbalanced panel of  1,308 observations  distributed across nine different 
agricultural sectors. 
Sector-specific  output prices for the capital shadow-value estimates are published in 
the U.S. Department of Labormureau ofLabor Statistics  Producer Price Index database; 
'Because these data include firm-level measures of financial performance,  they are  in  ratio form so that individual cooper- 
atives cannot be identified in the database. USDA officials merged our qualitative data with the financial ratio data. Richards and Manji-edo  Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions  16  1 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Estimation Procedure 
No. of  Total 
Std.  Mini-  Maxi-  Obser-  No. of 
Variable  Mean  Dev.  mum  mum  vations  Co-ops 
ASSET  TURNOVER RATIO  3.26  1.81  0.36  12.65  1,308  88 
RETURN  ON ASSETS  (%)  0.04  0.05  -0.20  0.45  1,308  88 
CURRENT  RATIO  1.39  0.43  0.56  4.79  1,308  88 
SALES  GROWTH  RATE  (%)  0.05  0.21  -0.63  3.33  1,308  88 
DEBT-TO-ASSET  RATIO  0.63  0.13  0.14  1.13  1,308  88 
LONG-TERM  DEBT-TO-ASSETRATIO  (K)  0.60  0.19  0.11  1.02  1,308  88 
GDP GROWTH  RA~  (%)  0.07  0.02  0.03  0.12  1,308  88 
S&P500 INDEX  GROWTH  RATE (%)  0.14  0.13  -0.10  0.34  1,308  88 
T-BILL YIELD  (%)  0.07  0.03  0.03  0.14  1,308  88 
VALUE OFAG  OUTPUT  ($ billion)  179.17  26.75  144.34  231.17  1,308  88 
AGRIBUSINESS  M&A (number)  87.48  23.87  56.00  157.00  1,308  88 
Table 3. Number of Cooperative Consolidation Transactions  by Time Period 
Strategic  Joint  Total 
Time Period  Mergers  Acquisitions  Alliances  Ventures  Consolidations 
input prices are taken from the same source, but are common across all cooperatives. 
Real interest rates, a measure of  the cost of capital, come from the U.S. Federal Reserve 
Board. Leverage is measured by the total debt-to-asset ratio and the extent of a cooper- 
ative's capital constraint by a ratio of long-term debt to total debt. Other macroeconomic 
data (real gross domestic product) are from the U.S. Federal Reserve Board. The value 
of U.S. agricultural output comes from the USDA's Agricultural Statistics database, and 
S&P 500 stock index data are from Commodity Systems, Inc. The number of  mergers 
and acquisitions among cooperatives and agribusinesses is from the transactions data- 
base which was assembled from the Food Institute's Food Business Mergers and Acqui- 
sitions data and other sources described above. 
Table 2 provides a statistical summary of  all variables used in the estimation proce- 
dure, and table 3 gives a breakdown of the number and type of  consolidation  transaction 
by  time period. 
If the shadow value of capital is estimated first, and then substituted into the discrete 
choice model as data, then the standard errors in the second stage will be inconsistent. 
In this study, however, both are estimated simultaneously  by imbedding the expression 
for A, directly into the multinomial logit model and then estimating using maximum 
likelihood. In this way, consistent  estimates of the shadow value, choice parameters, and 
their standard errors are obtained. Based on the data described here, the following 
section presents the econometric results and suggests some implications for future coop- 
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Results and Discussion 
Because the data consist of pooled time-series, cross-section observations for a number 
of cooperatives engaged in many different  types of business, binary indicators to control 
for any unobserved heterogeneity  between industrial sectors are  included.  All of the esti- 
mated results, therefore, are to be interpreted as conditional on the type of agricultural 
cooperative, whether dairy, input supply, cotton, grain, diversified, fruit and vegetable, 
sugar, or meat and poultry.1° 
The parameter estimates and standard errors are  reported in table 4. The significance 
of  A,  is tested using a Wald test on expression (3) and the multinomial logit structural 
parameters. This expression also permits a test ofwhether the underlying  profit function 
is concave in K. At the sample mean of  each price ratio (over all cooperatives and time 
periods), the value of  A,  is 27.304 and its t-ratio is 4.476. Therefore, the shadow value 
of  capital is positive, as hypothesized, and significantly different from zero at the 5% 
level. Further, given the shadow-value parameters in equation (3), the profit function 
is concave in K. This result also indicates that capital represents a binding constraint 
at  the sample mean, but does not directly imply this constraint represents a significant 
factor in driving individual cooperatives to merge. 
The importance of  capital constraints in driving cooperative consolidation is evident 
from the estimation results in table 5. In particular, the choice elasticities provide sup- 
port for the capital constraint hypothesis.''  In general,  the discrete  choice model provides 
an acceptable fit to the data. At a 5%  level of  significance with 68 degrees of freedom, 
a likelihood-ratio  test suggests rejecting  the null hypothesis that all of the P parameters 
are equal to zero. A test of the primary hypothesis involves determining whether the 
probability of  participating in any type of  merger and acquisition activity rises in the 
shadow value of  capital. If so, then cooperatives may indeed consolidate in order to ad- 
dress their lack of  capital. 
Table 5 presents the implied choice elasticities from the multinomial logit model. As 
is well known (Greenel,  the structural parameters of a multinomial logit model lack any 
intuitive content and may, in fact, differ in sign from the marginal effect.12  With respect 
to firm-level financial performance variables, the results in table 5 are somewhat sur- 
prising; none have a statistically significant impact on the probability of  some form of 
consolidation. This finding is likely explained by the presence of two competing effects. 
Whereas more efficient firms are more likely to be in a position to take over another, 
they are also less susceptible  to being taken over if efficiency is used to create financial 
strength. 
Among macroeconomic factors, the results reported in table 5 show that the decision 
to merge and form strategic alliances rises with interest rates. Although mergers typi- 
cally do not require the firms to raise large amounts of capital (particularly for coopera- 
tives because their mergers are  usually conducted at  book value), cooperative  managers 
should nonetheless face incentives to make more efficient use of  internal capital by 
merging when the cost of  external capital is rising. 
lo The precise association of each binary variable with a particular sector cannot be disclosed in order to protect the identi- 
ties of the cooperatives  in each. Four sectoral  binary variable  coefficients are estimated because  there are too few observations 
in the smaller sectors for the full model to converge. 
l1 The choice elasticities are defined as the proportionate  change in the expected probability of obsel-vingy, = 1 for an equi- 
proportionate change in each regressor: e"  = VxjP(i  I p)CI;.IP(i  I  p)). 
l2 The structural parameters and assohated't-statistics are available from the authors upon request. Richards and Manfredo  Cooperative Mergers and Acquisitions  163 
Table 4. Shadow Value of Capital Estimates 
Variable  Coefficient  t-Ratio 
(p,lK)%, where y = output, K  = long-term debt-to-asset ratio  0.344  1.325 
(p,,lK)%,  where x, = fuel  0.304*  3.560 
(p,,IK)%,  where x, = power  3.067*  3.053 
(p,,IK)%,  where x, = labor  -0.965*  -3.201 
Value of capital constraint  (A,)  27.304*  4.476 
No.  of obse~ations  = 1,149 
Notes: An asterisk(*) denotes statistical significance  at  the 5% level. In this table, the value of 1  is calculated from 
the other parameters, and its standard error is found using a Wald test on text equation (3). Note that these 
parameters and standard errors are  estimated jointly with those in table 5 (below)  in  the multinomial logit model. 
Table 5. Choice Elasticities for Consolidation Activities, Multinomial Logit 
Model 
Merger  Acquisition  Strategic Alliance  Joint Venture 
Variable  EM,  t-Ratio  Eqi  t-Ratio  Esqi  t-flatio  Ernj  t-Ratio 
ASSET  TURNOVER  RAno 
RETURN  ONASSETS 
CURRENT  RAno 
SALES  GROWTH  RATE 
DEBT-TO-ASSET  RATIO 
GDP GROWTH  RATE 
S&P500 INDEX GROWTH  RATE 
T-BILL  YIEW 
AGRIBUSINESS  M&A 
VALUE  OF AG OUTPUT 
No. of  observations = 1,149 
Notes: An asterisk (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. All  elasticities are calculated from the 
structural multinomial coefficients and are evaluated at  the mean of each variable and standard errors estimated 
via a Wald test procedure. We cannot disclose the precise association of  each variable with the particular sector 
in order to protect the identities of  the cooperatives in each. 
Results from table 5 also provide some evidence showing cooperative mergers are 
more likely when the value of agricultural output is rising. Contrary to the argument 
of Gort, our findings indicate cooperatives appear to merge in order to support growth 
and  to take advantage of prosperity, rather than as  a means of restructuring  and  elimin- 
ating competition when the  industry as  a whole is shrinking. Such pro-cyclical expansion 
may also reflect the  fact that  cooperatives are  merely extensions of individual members' 
businesses, expanding when the need to do so arises. 
Somewhat weaker support is  observed  for the  hypothesis that aggregate merger waves 
influence cooperative activity as  well. Whether in response to a perceived need to 
compete with non-cooperative rivals, or driven by the  same  fundamental factors as  other 
firms, the propensity of cooperatives to merge rises in the total number of  aggregate 
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Among the negative influences on cooperative mergers, the elasticity estimates in 
table 5 suggest more liquid and less leveraged cooperatives are more likely to merge, 
acquire, or form joint ventures. If a cooperative is earning a high return on assets, its 
managers may believe they are more likely to do well on their own and perceive little 
need for outside help. A high return on assets also suggests any agency problems are 
likely to be small. Indeed, while profitable cooperatives may generate a relatively large 
amount of cash, a high return on assets indicates this high rate of cash flow is  based on 
a relatively small asset base and not the bloated, inefficient example described by 
Jensen (1988). 
Similarly, a cooperative that  accumulates a large amount of cash may simply not need 
to merge with another. Whereas mergers among publicly traded firms often occur when 
a large amount of cash can be obtained for a relatively low market price, this is rarely 
a consideration of cooperatives. With respect to leverage, however, the negative effect 
on the probability of a merger is understandable, given that the estimation procedure 
controls for the  value of a firm's fmed capital as  well as  the absolute level. Cooperatives 
with relatively poor credit ratings make for less attractive suitors. 
Of primary interest among all of these variables is the effect of a cooperative's capital 
constraint on the propensity to merge. Using the shadow value of the fixed level of 
capital available to each cooperative as a measure of this constraint, the results from 
table 5 offer some support for the main hypothesis of  this study. With respect to the 
decision to merge, a 10%  rise in  the  value of capital to a cooperative leads to a 0.12% rise 
in the probability of  a merger. Although this elasticity is small, it is nonetheless of 
critical importance because of  its implications for how cooperatives are capitalized. In 
particular, if capital starvation is  indeed driving cooperatives to consolidate in the  search 
for more capital, this  at  least partially explains why "new-generation cooperatives" tend 
to employ more innovative financing and ownership structures  than  do traditional coop- 
eratives. 
It remains, however, to determine if these results are robust across the other types 
of  transactions, or if the capital-constraint effect is unique to mergers. Rather than 
merge, some cooperatives choose to consolidate through outright acquisitions of weaker 
rivals or vertical partners. Similar to the  merger results, the  results in table 5  show that 
leverage has a negative effect on the probability of acquiring another. Yet, unlike the 
merger case, more liquid cooperatives are more likely to acquire another, perhaps as 
expected. Further, among macroeconomic factors, only the value of agricultural output 
is significant. While higher interest rates are expected to have a negative impact on 
acquisitions, the  lack of statistical significance  may reflect the  fact that  the cost of higher 
interest is somewhat offset by the expectation of being able to charge higher prices in 
the  future; i.e., if interest rates tend to rise with expected inflation, managers expecting 
to be able to raise prices in the future may acquire other firms to solidify their position 
in key markets. These elasticities also show that liquidity has a positive impact on the 
tendency of a cooperative to make an acquisition, but leverage has a negative effect. In 
particular, less liquid,  highly leveraged cooperatives are  less likely to make acquisitions. 
While cooperatives with a high proportion of debt to assets on their balance sheet may 
not have the ability to finance a buyout, more liquid cooperatives may be able to do so. 
Whereas both mergers and acquisitions represent formal transactions which are  likely 
to be driven by the desire to own the target firm, other transactions are typically less 
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are common among both non-cooperatives and cooperatives alike, they are becoming 
particularly prevalent among cooperatives for the  following reasons: (a)  they are  consis- 
tent with the fundamental principles of cooperation, (b)  they do not require the transfer 
of ownership, (c) they are  more flexible as  to duration and  commitment, and (d)  they 
require  less capital. Nonetheless, many of the  statistically significant factors are  similar 
to those influencing mergers and acquisitions.13 
With respect to strategic alliances, the estimates in table 5 show that interest rates, 
the  value of agricultural output, and  the  shadow value of capital exhibit similar positive 
influences as  in the case of mergers. Clearly, strategic alliances will be more attractive 
the more costly formal acquisition transactions become. Like cooperative acquisitions, 
the probability of forming a strategic alliance rises in liquidity, but strategic alliances 
are unaffected by leverage. 
Interest rates, the value of agricultural output, and the shadow value of capital are 
all significant determinants of the decision to form a joint venture, but there are some 
important differences between this case and the determinants of  strategic alliances. 
Specifically,  strategic  alliances do not necessarily imply a specific commitment of capital, 
but rather a sharing  of critical organizational competencies  with another fm.  Aggregate 
economic performance is important to the incentive to form a strategic alliance; when 
expected growth rates are high, more potential enterprises are likely to become viable, 
and so corporate capital budgets are more likely to reach their limits. Also contrary to 
the other forms of consolidation, interest rates reduce the probability of a joint venture 
because a higher cost of  capital is likely to reduce the incentive to invest in any new 
venture as  fewer potential investments are able to meet higher hurdle rates. Similar to 
all of the  other transactions, however, capital constraints remain a consistent determin- 
ant of the likelihood a cooperative will form a joint venture. 
Indeed, these results suggest the emergence of a common theme in the analysis of 
each type of transaction. Whether the consolidation is a merger, acquisition, strategic 
alliance, or joint venture, each represents a relatively novel and flexible means of over- 
coming capital constraints which are typical of cooperative organizations. 
Conclusions and  Implications 
This study  has  sought to determine  whether the capital constraint faced by cooperatives 
has  fomented the  recent growth of cooperative mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, and 
strategic alliances. Using a sample  of the 100  largest U.S. agricultural cooperatives, this 
research finds that a higher shadow value of capital increases the  probability of a coop- 
erative's decision to merge, acquire, form a joint venture, or create a strategic alliance. 
In addition, the  econometric  estimates indicate consolidation  among agricultural cooper- 
atives  tends  to follow "merger waves" throughout the  non-cooperative agribusiness 
sector-perhaps  driven by the  need to match efficiencies gained by their non-cooperative 
rivals choosing to consolidate. 
A reviewer suggests that the rising popularity of strategic alliances and joint ventures may lead to spurious correlation 
among other trending variables in our data. However, the multinomial logit model is estimated only after differencing, or 
using growth rates for the nonstationarity series in our data-namely  GDP, stock prices, and agricultural output. 166  April 2003  Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 
Among other macroeconomic  factors, higher interest rates and higher value of agricul- 
tural output lead to a greater probability a cooperative will merge or form a strategic 
alliance with another, but a lower probability a cooperative will choose to form a joint 
venture. With respect to internal factors, the  profile of a consolidating cooperative 
describes an  efficient, minimally leveraged organization which is less liquid than 
average. Without access to publicly traded stock to serve as currency in a merger or 
acquisition, it  is not surprising  that  capital adequacy is an  important determinant of the 
likelihood of consolidation. 
Other implications  of this  research are clear. First, for cooperatives to  remain a viable 
business form, their managers should recognize the significant impediment to growth 
and competitiveness  presented by the  lack of access to public equity markets. Therefore, 
managers need to take advantage of innovative means of financing that address both 
the need of cooperative members to retain control and their need for external sources 
of capital. Second, a rapid rate of consolidation among efficient cooperatives should be 
viewed in a positive light as  a means by which the cooperative sector can remain 
competitive with non-cooperative rivals, rather  than as  an  indication of weakness or 
desperation. 
Future research may consider the relative importance of market power versus 
efficiency motives for consolidating (Jensen  and Ruback). Although this study shows 
that profitable cooperatives are no more likely to merge than others, separating these 
two motives may  produce different results. Additional research may also contribute 
to our understanding of merger and acquisition activity by using more detailed data 
that will allow for more refined measures of each area of financial performance, or by 
including more "qualitative" factors which allow for managerial hubris or unique situ- 
ations. 
[Received November 2001;Jinal revision received October 2002.1 
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